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ABSTRACT 
 
We report on the first demonstration of a two way Quantum Key Distribution protocol with 
decoy state. The experiment was conducted over free space medium and exhibits a significant 
increase in the maximum secure distance. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the introduction of BB84 protocol in 1984 [1], Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) 
combined with one time pad presents a likely candidate for an unconditionally secure method for 
information transfer between two distant parties. Over the last decade, practical aspect has been 
at the center of interest in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) where much of the efforts are in 
bridging the gap between the imperfect settings of QKD realization to the theoretical 
unconditional security proof [2,3].  While the imperfect settings is known to invite powerful 
attacks such as Photon Number Splitting (PNS) attack, it does not necessarily form a threat  to 
the security of the shared key but rather limits the secure key generation and the maximum 
secure distance. 
 
One recently introduced tool that equipped QKD against such sophisticated attacks is the decoy 
state method, first introduced by [4] and further developed for example by the work in [5-11]. In 
decoy state method, besides signal pulses, Alice and Bob use several other different intensities of 
coherent light pulses as decoy states. Since Eve cannot distinguish between the signal and decoy 
pulses, she has to apply the same strategy to all of them. As a result, any eavesdropping attempt 
by Eve will inevitably modify the photon statistic and expose her. [5].  
 
Theoretical as well as experimental progresses with regard to decoy state can be seen for 
example by works in [5-18]. One common aspect in these works is that they were all based on 
BB84 protocol. As for other protocol in prepare and measure scheme, extension to decoy state 
can be seen in [12,13] for SARG04 protocol. In the case of two way QKD protocols [19-27], 
recently, Shaari et al in [14] started the decoy state extension in particular with the LM05 which 
is a four state two way protocol by Lucamarini and Mancini [22,24]. They proposed a two decoy 
states extension as a practical decoy scheme for LM05. The result of their numerical analysis 
was quite encouraging given that the maximum secure distance is extended by almost double 
compared to the one without decoy state.  
 
In this work, we use the bounds obtained from our work in [31] in which we have extended the 
work in [14] to the case of “weak+vacuum”, first proposed by Lo et al for BB84 in [7]. While it 
has been shown in [7] that this special case of practical decoy states is in fact optimal for BB84, 
experimentally, the proposed scheme has obvious advantages in simplifying the setup at state 
preparation stage due to for example reduce number of photon source. While one may 
encounters problem with producing a “truly vacuum” state in a plug and play QKD setup due to 
difficulties such as in finding good attenuator, it is not the case for a one way QKD setup as it 
can be easily achieved by simply not triggering the laser sources which in this case fits well to 
our experimental setup. We then experimentally demonstrate an implementation of LM05 
protocol with the proposed weak+vacuum decoy state over free space medium. To the best of our 
knowledge this is the first time that an implementation of a two way QKD protocol with decoy 
state is realized. This letter is organized as follows. The ensuing sections introduce the proposed 
protocol as well as elaborations of the experimental setup. We then present our main results and 
analysis and conclude with suggestions for future works. 
. 
 
 
2. THE PROTOCOL 
 
In [31], we have simplified relevant bounds that led to the two secure key rate formulas 
represented by Eq 25 and Eq 26 in [14] and obtain for the case of “weak+vacuum”. While the 
former results in higher secure key rate and longer secure distance, the latter has an advantage of 
not having to concern on how Eve may manipulate the single and double photon contributions 
individually [14]. Note also that the former requires additional information by having to rely on 
the value of double photon yield () from infinite case denoted as  in Eq.10 of [14] to lower 
bound . As such, for simplicity, we make use of the latter throughout our experiment.  
Let us review the relevant bounds used in obtaining the lower bound of key generation rate . 
The lower bound  1  2
 for the case of “weak+vacuum” adapted from Eq. 19 of [14], is 
given by :  
 
 
where  is given by [7] as : 
 
 
The lower bound of effective gain ( )) and upper bound of effective error rate () is given 
by [14] as : 
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(4) 
The effective gain ( )) and error rate () can be plugged into the following Eq 5 for the 
lower bound of key generation rate, given by [14] as :  
    $  %&"'(&"'  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where  
(&"' is the binary Shannon Entrophy and is given by 
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3. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
 
The schematic of our experimental setup is depicted in Fig. 2. It is actually an extension of our 
previous setup for an automated LM05 protocol implementation over free space medium in [29]. 
We made several modifications at the source as well as at the LabVIEW program to 
accommodate the proposed decoy state extension. 
 
Our LabVIEW 8.5 based program, developed on top of a 40 MHz Reconfigurable I/O module of 
National Instruments (PXI-7833R) pair at Bob and Alice controls and synchronizes all the laser 
sources, Pockels cells and single photon counting modules.  The program used pseudo-random 
number generator to set random triggering of each laser source and Pockels cell. For the case of 
weak+vacuum decoy state, we set such that the pulses for weak decoy state, vacuum state and 
signal state are randomly distributed at 1:1:2. The pulse repetition rate of the FPGA was set to be 
0.725 MHz so that they operate within the safe region of below 1 MHz limitation of our Pockels 
cells. 
 
  
 
 
Fig. 2. The LM05 and decoy state experimental setup consists of SRC1, SRC2, photon source for 
signal state; SRC3,SRC4, photon source for decoy state ; BS1, BS2, BS3 beam splitter;PBS1, 
polarization beam splitter; SF, spatial filter; PC1, first Pockels cell; ATTN1, variable attenuator; 
BS1,BS2 50/50 beam splitter; ATTN2, ATTN3 attenuator; PC2, second Pockels cell; PC3, third 
Pockels cell; PC4, Fourth Pockels cell; IF1, interference filter; WOL1, Wollaston Prism; 
SPCM1, H & D detector; SPCM2, V & A detector. 
 
 
The photon source consists of four diode lasers (SRC1, SRC2, SRC3, SRC4) from Coherent 
CUBE with wavelength at 785 nm. The SRC1 and SRC2 pair is assigned as the source for signal 
state which emits either horizontal or vertical pulse respectively while the SRC3 and SRC4 pair  
is assigned for the decoy source. They are all separately attenuated to achieve the required 
intensities. Either one of these four lasers is randomly triggered at a time. Horizontal pulses from 
SRC1 and SRC3 are combined into horizontal optical path at BS1 while vertical pulses from 
SRC3 and SRC4 are combined into vertical optical path at BS2. Optical pulses from the two 
paths are finally combined into a same optical path at polarization beam splitter PBS1 before 
being spatially filtered at SF. The optical pulses further proceed to Pockels cell PC1 whose 
function is to randomly transform incoming horizontal or vertical pulse to diagonal or anti-
diagonal respectively. In this way, the combination of randomly triggered laser sources and PC1 
produces the required signal and weak decoy states. For the case of vacuum state, Bob simply 
choose to not trigger any of the the laser as well as the pockels cells.    
 
Each prepared photon pulse that reaches Alice will first go through the 50/50 beam splitter (BS3) 
used for simulating the effects of control mode and then proceed to the flipper (PC2,PC3) which 
is randomly flipped or not flipped by Alice for logical bit 1 or 0 encoding.  The operation of the 
flipper is described in detail in [28,29]. Encoded pulses returning from Alice enter Bob’s 
detection package by first going through the Pockels cell PC4 whose function is to actively 
prepare measurement basis to the one used at state preparation stage.. They are further 
polarization analyzed by the Wollaston prism WOL1 to be either detected at DET1 or DET2.  
 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
  
It is known that with certain known intrinsic parameters i.e. internal transmission of the system 
including detection efficiency (4567), erroneous detection probability (89:9;:6<) and background 
rate (), one may perform numerical simulation to determine the optimal mean photon number 
for a particular distance or channel loss as well as estimating maximum secure distance capable 
with a QKD setup [7,15,16]. We notice that estimation of maximum secure distance is very 
important in this experiment as it is of no use to perform decoy state at a distance where secure 
key generation is not anymore possible. As such, we first obtained intrinsic parameters measured 
from the experimental setup in which we obtained 4567  0.072 , 89:9;:6<  0.045  and 0  3.52 B 10!C. We then performed numerical simulation to estimate the capability of the 
proposed decoy state extension with this setup in terms of maximum secure distance. Note that 
due to differences in the setup and alignment accuracy, they are different to those previously 
used in [29]. We have also numerically searched the maximum key generation rate at every 
distance for the case of without decoy state and theoretical infinite decoy state. For the case of 
without decoy state, we based on the key rate formula in [24] while for the case of theoretical 
infinite decoy state, we based on the key rate formula in [14,31]. The two formulas are denoted 
as D and  respectively here. 
 
In conducting the experiment, we started with the case of without decoy state followed by the 
case of “weak+vacuum”. A same mean photon number closed to optimal as suggested by 
numerical simulation was used for every distance which is, specifically µ  0.31 and   0.13 
for  and   0.15 for D . As for the distance, we have made use of the two attenuators 
denoted as ATTN2 and ATTN3 in Fig 1 to simulate the channel loss. The data size used for each 
experimental plot was 140 Mbit.  The experimental result is shown in table 1.  
 
Table 1.  Experimental results for the case of “weak+vacuum” decoy state.  
 
Channel Loss 
(dB) 
FG HG FI HI JK L. MN 1.182 B 10! 4.487 B 10! 5.245 B 10! 4.448 B 10! 4.383 B 10!C P. MQ 4.588 B 10! 4.141 B 10! 2.137 B 10! 4.180 B 10! 3.518 B 10!C R. MP 2.059 B 10! 4.964 B 10! 8.470 B 10!U 5.084 B 10! 3.251 B 10!C Q. RK 1.086 B 10! 5.397 B 10! 4.706 B 10!U 5.410 B 10! 3.686 B 10!C V. PV 4.995 B 10!U 5.274 B 10! 2.120 B 10!U 5.468 B 10! 3.918 B 10!C W. NQ 2.837 B 10!U 6.215 B 10! 1.340 B 10!X 6.850 B 10! 3.947 B 10!C LL. KL 1.303 B 10!U 6.117 B 10! 5.711 B 10!X 8.473 B 10! 4.005 B 10!C 
 
 
Using experimental results in Table 1, we then calculate the lower bounds of single and double 
photon gain(), key rate () and upper bound of  by plugging into  Eq 1 ~ 7. The results are 
shown in Table 2. We used  %"
  1.22 for error correction efficiency. To better illustrate the 
results of this experiment, we have also plot relevant graph depicted in Fig 2. 
 
Table 2.  The Lower bounds of ,  and upper bound of . The values are calculated using 
Eq 1~7 with experimental data in Table 1.   
 
Channel Loss 
(dB) FLMY  ZLM[  \Y L. MN 9.535 B 10!     5.546 B 10! 3.108 B 10! P. MQ 3.518 B 10!     5.361 B 10! 1.188 B 10! R. MP 1.573 B 10!     6.421 B 10! 3.689 B 10!U Q. RK 8.310 B 10!U 
    6.887 B 10! 1.560 B 10!U V. PV 4.060 B 10!U 
    6.135 B 10! 1.029 B 10!U W. NQ 2.340 B 10!U 
    6.910 B 10! 4.058 B 10!X LL. KL 9.825 B 10!X     6.625 B 10! 1.411 B 10!X 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Experimental plot for the case of D ,   and   using instrinsic parameters of the 
setup as in Table 1. The  and are obtained using Eq 5 and D is obtained using key rate 
formula in [24] . The theoretical lines are based on numerical simulation results using intrinsic 
parameters 4567  0.072 , 89:9;:6<  0.045  and   3.52 B 10!C and with mean photon 
number closed to optimal with µ  0.31 and   0.13 for  and   0.15 for D . For  , 
optimal µ was used throughout every distance. 
 
From Fig 2, it is obvious that without decoy state, a maximum secure distance will only reach 
less than 8 dB channel loss. We verified at 9.51 dB that the secure key generation rate is negative 
for the case of without decoy state.  In contrast, using the proposed extension of “weak+vacuum” 
decoy state, one could easily extend the maximum secure distance by around two third of the one 
without decoy state which fits well with our previous numerical simulation results in [31] when 
we used data from GYS [32].  
  
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
 
 
We have successfully implemented a QKD system based on a two way protocol namely the 
LM05 and decoy state method over a free space medium. The experimental result verified the 
capability of the proposed scheme which significantly extends the maximum secure distance by 
around two third of the one without decoy state. The fact that only a simple extension to existing 
setup was needed suggests the practicality of this method and deserves further study.  
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